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UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT REVIEW OF
TENTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS
This is a new section in the Annual Tenth Circuit Survey. Presented
below are the case histories of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decisions
which were discussed in the Fourth (September 1, 1976 through August
31,1977) and Fifth (September 1, 1977 through August 31, 1978) surveys and
which sought Supreme Court review.
I.

A.

SUPREME COURT REVERSALS

Harrah Independent School District v. Martin
In Harrah Independent School Distrit v. Martt'

I

the Supreme Court re-

2

versed a 1978 decision of the Tenth Circuit involving the dismissal of an
Oklahoma school teacher who claimed a violation of due process and equal
protection.
The Oklahoma school district did not renew the tenured teacher's contract claiming she willfully neglected her duty. 3 The respondent's contract
required teachers holding only a bachelor's degree to earn five semester
hours of credit every three years. In 1969, when respondent was hired, the
sanction for noncompliance with the continuing education requirement was
the withholding of salary increases. Respondent refused to comply with the
requirement and forfeited salary increases through the school year 19731974. In 1973 the Oklahoma Legislature enacted a law mandating salary
increases for teachers regardless of compliance with the continuing education program. The school board then notified the respondent that continued
noncompliance would result in the nonrenewal of her contract. Respondent
appeared before the school board in January 1974 and indicated she would
not comply with the requirements of her contract. In April 1974 the school
4
board voted not to renew the teacher's contract.
Respondent unsuccessfully sought administrative relief and judicial relief in the state courts before bringing her action in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Oklahoma claiming she had been denied
her liberty and property without due process of law and equal protection of
the laws. 5 The District Court dismissed the complaint and respondent appealed to the Tenth Circuit. The Tenth Circuit reversed, finding there had
6
been a violation of the fourteenth amendment.
1. 99 S. Ct. 1062 (1979).

2. Martin v. Harrah Independent School Dist., 579 F.2d 1192 (10th Cir. 1978). For a

discussion of the Tenth Circuit's opinion in this case, see ConsttiutionalLaw, Fifth Annual Tenth
Circuit Surv, 56 DEN. L.J. 417, 422-24 (1979).

3. Oklahoma's tenure statute provided that "willful neglect of duty" was grounds for
nonrenewal of a tenured teacher's contract. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70 § 6-122 (West Supp.
1973).
4. 99 S. Ct. 1063.
5. Id.
6. 579 F.2d 1199.
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Reversing, the Supreme Court dealt briefly with the procedural due
process issue holding that respondent had been afforded all necessary procedural due process by having the opportunity to appear with counsel before
the school board to contest the board's determination. 7 Turning to the fourteenth amendment claims, the Court found no substantive due process violation because respondent's claim did not involve freedom of choice with
'8
respect to "basic matters."
The Supreme Court stated that the Tenth Circuit mistakenly relied on
the equal protection guaranty of the fourteenth amendment. Since no suspect classification or deprivation of fundamental constitutional right was alleged, the rational basis test was the standard to be applied and the agreed
facts showed that the school board's action was rationally related to a state
objective and the respondent was not singled out for special treatment. 9
Mary H. Hurley

B.

United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. McCombs
In United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. McCombs,I the Supreme Court reversed the

2
Tenth Circuit's decision in McCombs v. Federal Energy Regulatoy CommIsszon,

which had held that "abandonment" within the meaning of Section 7(b) of
the Natural Gas Act (Act) 3 did not require formal approval by the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (formerly the Federal Power Commission,
hereinafter FPC).
Certificates of convenience and necessity had been issued by the FPC in
1954 and 1963 to McCombs' predecessors, allowing them to sell natural gas
to United Gas Pipe Line Company (United). In 1966 the producer notified
United and the FPC that the gas well was depleted, and no further gas sales
were made to United from the tract. McCombs subsequently obtained assignment of the gas tract lease and in 1972 discovered new gas reserves in the
same tract, though at different and deeper drilling sites. He then contracted
to sell this newly discovered natural gas to E. I. duPont de Nemours and
Company in intrastate commerce.
United, upon learning of the new gas discovery and McCombs' intention to sell it to a third party, filed a complaint with the FPC asserting its
right to the gas. The FPC upheld the administrative law judge's decision
that the certificates issued to McCombs' predecessors in interest were for the
entire amount of natural gas in the tract, including the newly discovered
reserves. 4 The FPC declared that McCombs' attempt to sell the gas to an7. 99 S. Ct. 1064.
8. Id. (citing Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 244 (1976) as to "basic matters of procreation, marriage, and family life.")
9. Id. at 1064-65.
1. 99 S. Ct. 2461 (1979).
2. 576 F.2d 1376 (10th Cir. 1978). For a discussion of the Tenth Circuit's opinion, see
Lands and NaturalResources, Fifth Annual Tenth Cirtuit Survey, 56 DEN. L.J. 517, 531-34 (1979).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(b) (1976).
4. 99 S. Ct. at 2465.
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other intrastate party violated the Act and ordered McCombs to deliver all
gas produced on the tract to United.
McCombs appealed to the Tenth Circuit, asking the court to set aside
the order. The Tenth Circuit reversed the FPC, reasoning that the depletion
of the original well, the removal by United of all its metering equipment at
the site, and the lack of production or sale of natural gas to United for several years constituted "abandonment" in fact. 5 The Tenth Circuit also
noted that two letters by the FPC to the lessees of the tract, suggesting that
the lessees apply for abandonment approval, were tacit admissions by the
FPC that abandonment had occurred and that it need only be formalized
6
for the record.
In rejecting the Tenth Circuit's reasoning, the Supreme Court pointed
to the language in the original 1953 sale agreement which stated that all

"merchantable natural gas . . .now or hereafter" produced from the tract

would be sold to United. The Court further noted that there was no time
limitation on either of the certificates granted by the FPC and that United,
at the time of removal of its metering equipment from the original site in
1966, had stated it would reinstall the equipment, "if at some future date,
you have further gas to deliver to us at the above delivery7point, which will
be subject to the terms of the above-captioned contract."
The point on which the case turned was the explicit and clear language
of Section 7(b) of the Act, which states that, "No natural-gas company shall
abandon all or any portion of its facilities subject to the jurisdiction of the
Commission, or any service rendered by means of such facilities, without the
permission and approval of the Commission first had and obtained, after
due hearing, . . .."8 The Court found this language did not permit a "de
facto" abandonment or a tacit approval of abandonment by the FPC. McCombs' predecessors had twice ignored letters from the FPC warning them
that no abandonment application had been made. Absent the application
and the statutorily required hearing, there could be no abandonment within
the provisions of the Act. 9
The Court also pointed to its own language concerning abandonment
proceedings in Sunray Mid-Contihent Oil Co. v. FPC,i° in which it stated: "[I]f
the companies, failing to find new sources of gas supply, desired to abandon
service because of a depletion of supply, they would have to make proof
thereof before the Commission under § 7(b). ' " I The Court held that, under
the clear language of Section 7(b) and its own interpretation of this language
in Sunray, there could be no abandonment of a natural gas field without a
proper hearing before the Commission and specific FPC approval. The orig5. 570 F.2d at 1382.
6. Id. at 1379.
7. 99 S. Ct. at 2464.

8. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(b) (1976).
9. 99 S.Ct. at 2464, 2466.
10. 364 U.S. 137 (1960).
11. Id. at 158 n.25.
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inal FPC decision was reinstated. 12
Steve Brown

C.

Leo Sheep Co. v. United States
In Leo Sheep Co. v. United States' the Supreme Court reversed a Tenth

Circuit decision 2 that held Congress had impliedly reserved easements for
access to public domain sections of land in a land grant 3 to the Union Pacific
4
Railroad.
Petitioners were successors-in-interest to Union Pacific sections in Wyoming. Because of the "checkerboard" scheme of the Union Pacific grant, it
was impossible for members of the public to enter a section of recreationallyimproved public domain land, which interlocked petitioners' sections, without entering petitioners' land. After negotiations for public access over petitioners' land failed, the Government cleared a road cutting across the corner
of one of petitioners' sections and invited the public to use the road for access
to the public land. Petitioners brought an action to quiet title against the
Government as to the section corner burdened by the road, and the Wyoming District Court granted petitioners' motion for summary judgment.5
The Tenth Circuit reversed, reasoning that Congress must have impliedly reserved easements permitting access to public domain sections when
granting lands to the Union Pacific because "[t]o hold to the contrary would
be to ascribe to Congress a degree of carelessness or lack of foresight which
• . . would be unwarranted."' 6 The dissent argued that the Government's

failure to assert easements for 110 years constituted a persuasive administrative construction of the Union Pacific grant which should be accorded great
weight, and that the majority had misanalyzed the case by not recognizing
the key issue - "whether the United States may take theprivate landfor access
'7
purposes without compensation."

Reversing the appellate court, the Supreme Court initially held that the
common law easement by necessity for which the Government had argued
was conceptually precluded. The doctrine of easements by necessity inherently focuses on necessity at the date that a land grant is made. Since the
public land was unimproved in 1862, the doctrine did not, at that time,
reserve an easement for public recreational access and could not, in 1977,
12. 99 S. Ct. at 2470.
1. 99 S. Ct. 1403 (1979).
2. Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 570 F.2d 881 (10th Cir. 1977). For discussion of the
Tenth Circuit's opinion, see Lands and Natural Resources, Fourth Annual Tenth CircuitSurvey, 55 DEN.
L.J. 535, 538-39 (1978).
3. Act ofJuly 1, 1862, §§ 1-3, 12 Stat. 489-92, as amended, Act ofJuly 2, 1864, § 4, 13 Stat.
358.
4. 570 F.2d at 885.
5. 99 S. Ct. at 1409.
6. 570 F.2d at 885.
7. Id. at 889-90 (Barrett, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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retroactively reserve an easement. 8 The Court additionally found the doctrine inapplicable because the Government's power of eminent domain precludes the existence of any "necessity" on the facts.9
After disposing of the argument for an easement by necessity, the Court
focused on the congressional intent underlying the Union Pacific grant. The
Court noted initially that the grant contained explicit reservations in favor
of the United States and its grantees, and that it would be anomalous for the
same Congress that had scrupulously carved specific exceptions out of the
grant to have knowingly intended for access easements to be reserved by
mere implication. The Court then stressed that, since the purpose of the
grant was to induce the grantee to risk a great amount of capital in constructing a vital public improvement, the rule of construction favoring the
Government as grantor could not be applied "in its full vigor" to the Union
Pacific grant. Rather, the grant was to receive a "more liberal construction."' 0 Under this liberal approach, the Court refused to devine any intent
to reserve easements from the passage of the Unlawful Inclosures Act. '' Furthermore, the Court held Camfield v. United States' 2 inapplicable as being
predicated on a "nuisance" rationale not present in Leo Sheep.' 3
In conclusion, the Court discussed the unprecedented nature of the
Government's claim and the longstanding administrative construction of the
grant which was adverse to the existence of an implied reservation. ' 4 Given
the dearth of substance in the Government's intent argument, the Court
opted for fostering security of titles rather than an "ill-defined power to construct public thoroughfares without compensation."' 5
David C Halford

D.

United States v. Rutherford

In United States v. Rutherford,' the Supreme Court reversed a Tenth Circuit opinion 2 and upheld the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the
agency's latest battle with supporters of the cancer drug laetrile.
The legal controversy has focused on whether laetrile is a "new drug"
within the meaning of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. 3 The
8. 99 S. Ct. at 1410. For an analogous rationale, see United States v. New Mexico, 98 S.
Ct. 3012 (1978), holding that an "implied reservation" of water for a national forest is limited in
scope by the purposes for which the forest was segregated from the public domain.
9. 99 S. Ct. at 1410.
10. Id. at 1411 (citing United States v. Denver & Rio Grande Ry., 150 U.S. I, 14 (1893)).
!1. Unlawful Inclosures of Public Lands Act of 1885, 23 Stat. 321, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1061-66.
12. 167 U.S. 518 (1897).
13. 99 S. Ct. at 1411-12.
14. Id. at 1413.
15. Id. at 1413-14.

I. 99 S. Ct. 2470 (1979).
2. Rutherford v. United States, 582 F.2d 1234 (10th Cir. 1978).
3. 21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(1) (1976). This section defines a new drug as one that experts
"qualified by scientific training and experience" do not generally recognize as safe and effective.
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FDA classified laetrile as "new" and maintained that it was to be excluded
4
from interstate commerce.
When the dispute initially reached the Tenth Circuit, the court upheld
a district court injunction against the FDA on the grounds that the agency
had classified laetrile without making any formal findings. 5 The court of
appeals remanded and ordered the FDA to develop an administrative record. After hearings, the FDA again concluded that laetrile was not
generally
6
recognized as safe and effective, and was therefore a new drug.
Rutherford v. United States came before the Tenth Circuit 7 a second time
on appeal from a decision of the District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma which vacated the FDA ruling.8 The district court held: 1) the
FDA's findings that laetrile was not exempt under the "1962 grandfather
clause" 9 was arbitrary and capricious; t O and 2) prohibiting terminally ill
cancer patients from using laetrile was an unconstitutional invasion of privacy. II
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit again upheld an injunction against the
FDA, but did not consider the district court's grounds. Instead, the decision
of the court of appeals was based on the inapplicability of the "safe and
effective" standard of the Act' 2 to laetrile use by terminally ill individuals.
Chief Judge Seth, for the Tenth Circuit, held that "safe and effective" had
13
no meaning for cancer patients who would die regardless of treatment.
In UnitedStates v. Rutherford, 14 the Supreme Court disagreed. The Court
found effectiveness was not limited to the capacity to cure. "[A] drug is effective if it fulfills . . . its sponsor's claims of prolonged life, improved physical condition, or reduced pain."' 15 Similarly, the Court found "a drug is
unsafe if its potential for inflicting death or physical injury is not offset by
16
the possibility of therapeutic benefit."'
Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous Court, held that the clear
language of the statute and the legislative history indicated no special provisions were intended for the terminally ill. 17 His opinion noted that, rather,
Congress intended that the FDA protect individuals with fatal illnesses from
fraudulent cures.1 8 In addition, the Court commented that an ineffective
4. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (1976) prohibits the introduction into interstate commerce of any
new drug unless an application filed with the FDA, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 355(b), is approved.
5. Rutherford v. United States, 542 F.2d 1137 (10th Cir. 1976). This decision is discussed
in Admi)nistratie Law, Fourth Annual Tenth Circuit Survey, 55 DEN. L.J. 391, 392-95 (1978).
6. See note 3 supra.
7. 582 F.2d 1234 (10th Cir. 1978).
8. 438 F. Supp. 1287 (W.D. Okla. 1977).
9. The Drug Amendments of 1962 provided that drugs which were marketed before October 10, 1962 and which were generally recognized as safe were exempt from the "new drug"
test of 21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(1). 21 U.S.C. § 321 (1976) (note).
10. 438 F. Supp. at 1295.
11. Id.at 1299-1301.
12. 21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(1) (1976).
13. 582 F.2d at 1237.
14. 99 S. Ct. 2470 (1979).
15. d. at 2477.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 2475-76.
18. Id. at 2475.
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drug could be particularly unsafe for patients with potentially fatal diseases
if it caused them to reject conventional treatment. 9
The laetrile controversy, however, has not yet reached a final resolution.
The case was remanded to the Tenth Circuit for consideration of the consti20
tutional and grandfather clause questions raised in the district court.
SqTmourJoseph
II.
A.

DENIALS OF CERTIORARI

Cases from Fourth
Annual Survey

Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co.
Doe v. Pringle
First National Bank v. United
States
Franklin v. Atkins
Gillihan v. Rodriguez
G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United
States
Harr v. Federal Home Loan Bank
Board
Harr v. Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n
Los Alamos School Board v.
Wugalter
Marvel v. United States
Mondragon v. Tenorio
McGrath v. Weinberger
Napier v. Gertrude
Pacific Engineering & Production
Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp.
Staton v. Mayers
United States v. Allen
United States v. Brinklow
United States v. Davis
United States v. Evans
United States v. Fairfax
United
United
United
United

States
States
States
States

v.
v.
v.
v.

Gunter
Munz
Nolan
Plum

United States v. Rosenfeld
United States v. Shoemaker
United States v. Sor-Lokken
United States v. Walton
Utah State University of Agriculture & Applied Science v. Bear,
Stearns & Co.

Tenth Circuit Citation

Certiorari Denied

554 F.2d 381 (1977)
550 F.2d 596 (1976)

434 U.S. 921 (1977)
431 U.S. 916 (1977)

552 F.2d 370 (1977)
562 F.2d 1188 (1977)
551 F.2d 1182 (1977)

434 U.S. 835 (1977)
435 U.S. 994 (1978)
434 U.S. 845 (1977)

560 F.2d 1011 (1977)

435 U.S. 923 (1978)

557 F.2d 747 (1977)

434 U.S. 1033 (1978)

557 F.2d 571 (1977)

434 U.S. 1033 (1978)

557
548
554
541
542

434
431
434
430
429

F.2d
F.2d
F.2d
F.2d
F.2d

709
295
423
249
825

(1977)
(1977)
(1977)
(1976)
(1976)

551 F.2d 790 (1977)
552 F.2d 908 (1977)
554 F.2d 398 (1977)
560 F.2d 1003 (1977)
544 F.2d 1056 (1976)
542 F.2d 805 (1976)
No. 77-1055
(July 28, 1977)
546 F.2d 861 (1976)
542 F.2d 1382 (1976)
551 F.2d 266 (1977)
558 F.2d 568 (1977)
545
542
557
552

F.2d
F.2d
F.2d
F.2d

98 (1976)
561 (1976)
755 (1977)
1354 (1977)

549 F.2d 164 (1977)

U.S. 968 (1977)
U.S. 967 (1977)
U.S. 905 (1977)
U.S. 933 (1977)
U.S. 1049 (1977)

434 U.S. 879 (1977)

434 U.S. 907 (1977)
434 U.S. 836 (1977)
434 U.S. 1047 (1978)
436 U.S. 930 (1978)
429 U.S. 1101 (1977)
certiorari denied
October 3, 1977
431 U.S. 920 (1977)
429 U.S. 1104 (1977)
434 U.S. 904 (1977)
certiorari denied-citation not yet available
430 U.S. 941 (1977)
429 U.S. 1004 (1976)
434 U.S. 894 (1977)
431 U.S. 959 (1977)

434 U.S. 890 (1977)

Further Developments:
Unified School District No. 480 v. Epperson, 551 F.2d 254 (10th Cir. 1977), vacated, 435 U.S. 948
(1978). The case was remanded to the Tenth Circuit for further consideration in light of Carey v.
Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
19. Id. at 2477.
20. Id. at 2479 n. 18.
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Cases from Fifth
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Alden v. Ryan
Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
Celebrity Inc. v. A & B Instrument Co.
Farmers Alliance Mutual Insurance Co. v. Jones
Furedy v. Appleman (In re Vodeo
Volume Development Co.)
Globe Construction Co. v.
Oklahoma City Housing Authority

McDaniel v. State
Transok Pipeline Co. v. Darko
United States v. Austin
United States v. Black
United States v. Carleo
United States v. Fritz
United States v. Grismore
United States v. Haro
United States v. Lamb
United
United
United
United
United
United
United

States
States
States
States
States
States
States

v.
v.
v.
v.
v.
v.
v.

McCoy
Nelson
Oakes
Rumpf
Shovea
Thomas
Thompson
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10th Circuit

Certiorari Denied

571 F.2d 1159 (1978)

439 U.S. 860 (1978)

561 F.2d 1365 (1977)

434 U.S. 1052 (1978)
(cert. dwsrsed)

573 F.2d 11 (1978)

439 U.S. 824 (1978)

570 F.2d 1384 (1978)

439 U.S. 825 (1978)

567 F.2d 967 (1977)

439 U.S. 806 (1978)

571 F.2d 1140 (1978)

439 U.S. 835 (1978) (sub
nom. General Insurance Co. v.
Oklahoma City
Housing Authority)
439 U.S. 969 (1978)
435 U.S. 1006 (1978)
409 U.S. 1048 (1972)
435 U.S. 944 (1978)
439 U.S. 850 (1978)
439 U.S. 947 (1978)
435 U.S. 954 (1978)
439 U.S. 851 (1978)
439 U.S. 854 (1978) (sub
nom. Clary v. United
States)
436 U.S. 958 (1978)
439 U..S. 1079 (1979)
435 U.S. 926 (1978)
439 U.S. 893 (1978)
440 U.S. 908 (1979)
439 U.S. 1130 (1979)
439 U.S. 896 (1978)

582
565
462
569
576
580
564
573
575

F.2d
F.2d
F.2d
F.2d
F.2d
F.2d
F.2d
F.2d
F.2d

1242 (1978)
1150 (1977)
724 (1972)
1111 (1978)
846 (1978)
370 (1978)
929 (1977)
661 (1978)
1310 (1978)

573
582
564
576
580
580
579

F.2d
F.2d
F.2d
F.2d
F.2d
F.2d
F.2d

14 (1978)
1246 (1978)
384 (1977)
818 (1978)
1382 (1978)
1036 (1978)
1184 (1978)

Further Developments:
Utah v. Kleppe, 586 F.2d 756 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. grantedsub nom. Andrus v. Utah, 99 S. Ct.
2857 (1979).
NLRB v. Nat'l Jewish Hosp. & Research Center, 583 F.2d 911 (10th Cir. 1978), vacatedmem., 99 S.
Ct. 3094 (1979). The judgment was vacated and the case remanded to the Tenth Circuit for
further consideration in light of the Court's recent decision, NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 99 S.
Ct. 2598 (1979).
United States v. Blucher, 581 F.2d 244 (10th Cir. 1978), vacatedmem., 439 U.S. 1061 (1979). The
judgment was vacated and the case remanded to the district court with instructions to dismiss the
indictment, Justices White, Powell, and Rehnquist dissenting.
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